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I. INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Code) provides three means for satisfying the
claim of a secured creditor in a dissenting class.' First, the secured creditor can retain its
lien and receive payments over time, with a present value at least equal to the value of the
secured creditor's interest in its collateral. 2 Second, the Code also authorizes the sale of
collateral with the secured creditor's lien attaching to the proceeds of the sale.' Third, the
debtor can provide the secured creditor with the "realization" of the "indubitable equiva-
lent" of its claim.4
The asset payment plan is a means for satisfying a secured claim. Generally, all or part
of the secured creditor's collateral is distributed to the secured creditor through the asset
t 1990 by Neil P. Olack. All rights reserved.
* Partner, Watkins, Ludlam & Stennis, Jackson, Mississippi. B.A. Lehigh University, 1978; J.D. Emory University, 1981.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Jeffrey R. Barber.
1. 11 U.S.C. § I I29(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 11978) [hereinafter all Code provisions cited refer to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978].
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 11978).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1 1978).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. I 1978).
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payment plan in satisfaction of the secured claim or the entire debt.5 The value of the col-
lateral is determined by the bankruptcy court and constitutes the amount of the "payment."
Debtors have increasingly found asset payment plans an attractive means for eliminating
secured debt. Lenders have not reacted favorably to asset payment plans, arguing that the
risk of error in a court-determined valuation is being shifted improperly to the lender.
The case law is divided on whether an asset payment plan can satisfy the indubitable
equivalent requirement of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Code. The Fifth Circuit re-
cently reversed a bankruptcy court decision and endorsed asset payment plans in the case
of In re Sandy Ridge Development Corp.6 Several courts that refused to confirm asset pay-
ment plans cited the bankruptcy court's decision. This article focuses on the asset payment
plan in which payment is made by transfer of collateral7 and the secured creditor is prohib-
ited from seeking a deficiency claim after the collateral is liquidated. Both sides of the is-
sue will be reviewed, and an attempt will be made to resolve the conflicting authorities by
focusing on the legislative history of the Code and the practical problems associated with
the asset payment plan.
II. CONFIRMATION AND THE INDUBITABLE EQUIVALENT REQUIREMENT
A Chapter 11 plan must classify claims properly and specify treatment for each separate
class." A claim is properly classified if it is "substantially similar to other claims or inter-
ests of such class."9 Each secured claim is generally classified separately since the collat-
eral securing each claim and its relative priority will differ."° A secured creditor will be
permitted to vote whether to accept or reject a plan unless the plan leaves the secured claim
5. The cases use a variety of terms to describe how the "payment" will occur. See, e.g., In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 881
F.2d 1346 (5th Cit. 1989) ("transfer"); In re Thornebrook Dev. Corp., 96 Bankr. 350, 352 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) ("forced
transfer of property"); In re B.W. Alfa, Inc., 100 Bankr. 831, 833 (N.D. Tex. 1988) ("forced deed in lieu of foreclosure"); In re
Arnold, 80 Bankr. 806, 808 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987) ("abandonment and satisfaction of a claim"); In re Elijah, 41 Bankr. 348,
349 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) ("surrender part of the property to creditors to satisfy their secured positions in full"). The use of
the term "abandonment" has led to confusion. One court has stated that the legislative history of section 1129 of the Code indi-
cates that abandonment of property to a secured creditor is the indubitable equivalent of the creditor's claim since the creditor
retains all of its state law remedies, including the right to seek a deficiency. See In re Thornebrook Dev. Corp., 96 Bankr. at 352.
The concept of "abandonment in full satisfaction of a claim" appears contradictory.
6. 881 F.2d 1346, rehg denied, 889 F2d 663 (5th Cir. 1989).
7. But see In re Future Energy Corp., 83 Bankr. 470 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (proposed transfer of stock to objecting credi-
tors in satisfaction of their secured claims held insufficient to meet the indubitable equivalent requirement).
8. Waas, Letting the Lender Have It: Satisfaction of Secured Claims ByAbandoningA Portion ofthe Collateral, 62 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 97, 98 (1988). Seealso II U.S.C. § 1122 (Supp. 11978). Bankruptcy Rule 3013 provides: "For the purposes ofthe plan and
its acceptance, the court may, on motion after hearing on notice as the court may direct, determine classes of creditors and equity
security holders pursuant to §§ 1122 and 1322(b)(1) of the Code." 11 U.S.C. app. § 3013 (Supp. 1 1978).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (Supp. 1 1978). This section provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a plan may place a claim or an interest in a particular class only
if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such class.
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims consisting only of every unsecured claim that is less than or reduced
to an amount that the court approves as reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience.
10. Waas, supra note 8, at 98 (citing 5 COLUER ON BANKRUPCY I 1122.03[6] (15th ed. 1979)).
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unimpaired.11 A secured claim is unimpaired if the plan "leaves unaltered the legal, equit-
able, and contractual rights to which such claim . . . entitles the holder of such claim" or
pays the claim in cash. 12 If an impaired class consisting of a secured creditor rejects the
plan, it may be confirmed only through the so-called "cram down" provisions of the
Code. 13
A plan may be confirmed over the objection of an impaired class through cram down if
it "does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of
claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan." 14 The require-
ment that a plan not "discriminate unfairly" is generally interpreted to mean that no class is
over-compensated.15 The requirement that a plan be "fair and equitable" differs depending
upon whether the class is comprised of secured creditors, unsecured creditors, or inter-
ests.16 As for a secured creditor, "fair and equitable" is defined in section 1 129(b)(2)(A) of
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a), (f) (Supp. 1 1978). These subsections provide:
(a) The holder of a claim or interest allowed under section 502 of this title may acceptor reject a plan. If the United
States is a creditor or equity security holder, the Secretary of the Treasury may acceptor reject the plan on behalf of the
United States.
(f) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a class that is not impaired under a plan, and each holder of a
claim or interest of such class, are conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan, and solicitation of acceptances with
respect to such class from the holders of claims or interests of such class is not required.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (Supp. 11978). This section states:
Except as provided in section 1123(a)(4) of this title, a class of claims or interests is impaired under a plan unless, with
respect to each claim or interest of such class, the plan-
(I) leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of
such claim or interest;
(2) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law that entitles the holder of such claim or interest to de-
mand or receive accelerated payment of such claim or interest after the occurrence of a default-
(A) cures any such default that occurred before or after the commencement of the case under this title, other than
a default of a kind specified in section 365(b)(2) of this title;
(B) reinstates the maturity of such claim or interest as such maturity existed before such default;
(C) compensates the holder of such claim or interest for any damages incurred as a result of any reasonable reli-
ance by such holder on such contractual provision or such applicable law; and
(D) does not otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the
holder of such claim or interest; or
(3) provides that, on the effective date of the plan, the holder of such claim or interest receives, on account of
such claim or interest, cash equal to-
(A) with respect to a claim, the allowed amount of such claim; or
(B) with respect to an interest, if applicable, the greater of-
(i) any fixed liquidation preference to which the terms of any security representing such interest entitle the
holder of such interest; or
(ii) any fixed price at which the debtor, under the terms of such security, may redeem such security from
such holder.
13. Waas, supra note 8, at 98. See also I t U.S.C. § I 129(b)(1) (Supp. 11978). Section 1 129(b)(1) provides:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding section 510(a) of this title, if all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section
other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm
the plan notwithstanding the requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and
equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.
Under § 1129(b) the court may force confirmation of a plan upon a dissenting impaired class of creditors. When the court con-
firms a plan against the vote of a dissenting impaired class, this class is considered to have received a "cramdown." See generally
Booth, The Cradown on Secured Creditors:An Impetus Towards Settlement, 60 Am. BANKR. L.J. 69 (1986); Broude, Cransdown
and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAW. 441 (1984); Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know
About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(1) (Supp. 11978), supra note 13.
15. Waas, supra note 8, at 99 (citing In re Winston Mills, Inc., I Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 121 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
16. Waas, supra note 8, at 99.
1989]
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the Code as follows:
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable
with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides -
(i) (I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims,
whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or
transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such
claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value
of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is
subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with
such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such
liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or (iii) for
the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such claims.
The asset payment plan is neither a cash payment nor sale of assets. Therefore, sections
1129(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Code are not relevant. Accordingly, the analysis must fo-
cus on section 1 129(b)(2)(A)(iii) and on whether the secured creditor will realize the "in-
dubitable equivalent" of its claim by the debtor's transfer of all or part of the collateral.
1II. ORIGIN OF INDUBITABLE EQUIVALENT REQUIREMENT
The term "indubitable equivalence" finds its origin" in Judge Learned Hand's opinion
in In re Murel Holding Corp. i In Murel the secured creditor held a mortgage on an apart-
ment house.1 9 After the debtors defaulted on the mortgage, the creditor attempted to fore-
close. 20 The debtors obtained a stay of foreclosure after filing a petition for reorganization
under section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.21 The debtors then proposed a plan of
reorganization to pay the creditor interest over ten years, with full payment of the principal
due at the end of that time period. 22 The plan, however, made no provision for amortiza-
tion of principal over the ten-year period.23 The creditor rejected the plan and moved to
vacate the stay, which was denied.24 On appeal the creditor claimed that its interests were
not adequately protected.25
Judge Hand, writing for the court, refused to confirm the "wholly speculative" plan,
since the creditor would receive neither money, the property, nor an equivalent substi-
tute.26 The court found that the treatment of the secured claim was insufficient to justify
17. In re Fursman Ranch, 38 Bankr. 907, 908 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
18.75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
19. Id. at 941.
20. id.
21. Id.
22. id. at 942.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 941.




the stay of the foreclosure action in state court. 27 In explaining the concept of adequate pro-
tection, Judge Hand wrote:
In construing so vague a grant, we are to remember not only the underlying purposes of the
section, but the constitutional limitations to which it must conform. It is plain that "adequate
protection" must be completely compensatory; and that payment ten years hence is not gener-
ally the equivalent of payment now. Interest is indeed the common measure of the difference,
but a creditor who fears the safety of his principal will scarcely be content with that; he wishes
to get his money or at least the property. We see no reason to suppose that the statute was
intended to deprive him of that in the interest of junior holders, unless by a substitute of the
most indubitable equivalence.28
The legislative history of the Code indicates that Congress derived the term "indubita-
ble equivalent" contained in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Code from Murel.2' This
term first appeared in the Senate version of section 1129(b) as part of the cram down pro-
visions.30 Without the use of the term "indubitable equivalent," it was not clear whether
section 1129(b) required present value compensation." The final form of section
1 129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) requires deferred cash payments under a reorganization plan to equal
the present value of the allowed claim. 32 "The 'indubitable equivalent' requirement appears
in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) as an alternative to deferred payments and carries with it,
from its original context in Murel, the requirement of compensation for present value."3 3
IV. ASSET PAYMENT PLANS PRIOR TO Sandy Ridge DECISION
A number of courts addressed the viability of asset payment plans prior to the bank-
ruptcy court's decision in In re Sandy Ridge Development Corp. 34 A review of these con-
flicting authorities demonstrates a lack of clarity on the issue of whether a forced transfer
of property to a secured creditor results in the realization of the indubitable equivalent.
The case of In re Wieberg3 s involved an asset payment plan. 36 The debtors proposed to
deed over to the secured creditor a combination of land subject to the secured creditor's
deed of trust, land not subject to the secured creditor's deed of trust, and a cash payment. 7
27. Id.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Sandy Ridge, 881 F.2d at 1350. See also ln re Sun Country Dev., Inc., 764 F.2d 406,409 (5th Cir. 1985); In re American
Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Hollanger, 15 Bankr. 35, 45-46 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981); 124
CONG. REC. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6436, 6475); Haines, When Is Returning the Collateral the Indubitable Equivalent? 12 NORTON BANKR. L. ADvisER 4, 5
(1989); Waas, supra note 8, at 100. See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPtrcy 1129.03 (15th ed. 1989).
30. In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d at 433. The portions of American Mariner relating to adequate protection
of the interests of undersecured creditors have been overruled by United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc.,
484 U.S. 365 (1988). American Mariner is cited herein solely for its discussion of the legislative history of§ 1129(b) of the Code.
31. In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d at 433.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing 124 CONG. REC. HI 104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards approving present value analysis
at H.R. REP. No. 595 at 414-15, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6436, 6470-71); S. REP. No. 989 at
127, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5787, 5913) ("The indubitable equivalent language is intended to
follow the strict approach taken by Judge Learned Hand in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935)").
34.77 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987).
35.31 Bankr. 782 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1983).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 783.
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The debtor would retain some land, free and clear of the lien of the secured creditor. 38 The
court in Wieberg refused to confirm the plan and dismissed the bankruptcy case. 39 The
court found that the fair and equitable requirements were not met since the property to be
transferred was more than $300,000 less than the secured claim. 40 While it has been sug-
gested that the Wieberg court did not object to asset payment plans per se,4 the plan was
not confirmed, and the broad issues surrounding asset payment plans were not ad-
dressed.
42
The bankruptcy court in In re Fursman Ranch4 3 confirmed a plan of reorganization
which proposed to convey a portion of real property to certain creditors which held secu-
rity interests in the property." The creditors objected to the value assigned to the real prop-
erty.48 In confirming the plan, the court found that fair market value was the appropriate
standard for valuation.46 The creditors could dispose of the property in a commercially
reasonable manner since the debtor was surrendering the property to the creditors, and, as
a result, foreclosure was unnecessary.47 The court further found that the creditors were
provided an additional safeguard because the case was "ongoing."48 If a commercially rea-
sonable sale by the creditors did not result in payment approximating the value set by the
court, the creditors could ask for reconsideration of their claims. 49 The court did not dis-
cuss the mechanics of such reconsideration. The provisions for sale of the real property by
the creditors and potential liability by the debtors for the deficiency suggest that the court
was not faced with a true asset payment plan.
An asset payment plan was considered in the case of In re Elijah. In Elijah the plan
proposed to surrender part of the collateral to satisfy the secured claims in full.5' The
debtor asserted that the creditors were oversecured and that the proposal left the claims
unimpaired. 2 The creditors contested the debtor's characterization of their claims and
contended that they could only be paid by surrender of all their collateral.53 Some of the
secured creditors made an election to have their claims treated as fully secured under sec-
38. Id.
39. Id. at 785-86.
40. Id. at 785.
41. In re Walat Farms, 70 Bankr. 330, 336 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
42. Wieberg, 31 Bankr. at 785.
43. 38 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
44. Id. at 908. Confirmation was conditioned upon the debtor's amending the plan to confirm to several court directives. Id.
at 913.
45. Id. at908.
46. Id. at 910.
47. Id.
48. id.
49. Id. (comparing In re Crosthwait, 34 Bankr. 469 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983)).
50.41 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
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tion 11 11 (b) of the Code. These creditors argued that this election prevented the debtor
from returning less than all the collateral in which the creditors held an interest in satisfac-
tion of their respective claims. 55 The Elijah court held that the debtor could propose in the
plan the return of part of the collateral in which the creditor held an interest in full satisfac-
tion of the debt. 56 But if the creditor sold the surrendered collateral and the sale price was
less than the claim, the creditor, as a result of the election, could require the debtor to sur-
render more collateral or to pay the balance of the claim as secured.5 7 The effect of the
section 11 11 (b) election was to have the deficiency treated as a secured claim.58
The bankruptcy court did not confirm the plan in Elijah but only allowed the debtor
time to amend . 9 The court noted that oversecured creditors were entitled to receive only
the present value of the allowed amount of their claim in cash. 60 As a result, the proposal to
surrender collateral in satisfaction of debt may have been defective in that no provision ex-
isted for recapture of funds if the sale proceeds exceeded the present value of the claim of
the creditors. 6
The Fifth Circuit confirmed an asset payment plan in In re Sun Country Development,
Inc. 62 Although the "payment" was not made by a transfer of collateral, a discussion is in
order since this case is often cited as an authority in support of asset payment plans gener-
54. Id. at 351. Section 111 (b) provides:
(l)(A) A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be allowed or disallowed under section 502 of this title
the same as if the holder of such claim had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such
holder has such recourse, unless-
(i) the class of which such claim is a part elects, by at least two-thirds in amount and more than half in
number of allowed claims of such class, application of paragraph (2) of this subsection; or
(ii) such holder does not have such recourse and such property is sold under section 363 of this title or is to
be sold under the plan.
(B) class of claims may not elect application of paragraph (2) of this subsection if-
(i) the interest on account of such claims of the holders of such claims in such property is of inconsequen-
tial value; or
(ii) the holder of a claim of such class has recourse against the debtor on account of such claim and such
property is sold under section 363 of this title or is to be sold under the plan.
(2) If such an election is made, then notwithstanding section 506(a) of this title, such claim is a secured claim to the
extent that such claim is allowed.
II U.S.C. § llIl(b) (1978).
Bankruptcy Rule 3014 provides:
An election of application of § I 111 (b)(2) of the Code by a class of secured creditors in a Chapter 9 or 11 case may be
made at any time prior to the conclusion of the hearing on the disclosure statement or within such later time as the court
may fix. The election shall be in writing and signed unless made at the hearing on the disclosure statement. The elec-
tion, if made by the majorities required by § Ill I(b)(l)(A)(i), shall be binding on all members of the class with respect
to the plan.
11 U.S.C. app. § 3014 (1978).
Section 1111 (b) of the Code permits a secured creditor to waive the unsecured portion of its claim and elect to have the entire
claim treated as secured. In re Griffiths, 27 Bankr. 873, 875 (Bankr. Kan. 1983). The section 1111 (b) election was intended to
permit an undersecured creditor to avoid having the claim split into secured and unsecured portions as would normally occur
under § 506(a) of the Code. The election enables the creditor to obtain the benefit of any appreciation in value of its collateral
over time. Elijah, 41 Bankr. at 351.
55. Id.






62. 764 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1985).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
ally. In Sun Country the creditor had sold 500 acres of land to the debtor, retaining a first
lien on the land.6 3 At the time of the debtor's default, the secured creditor had released its
first lien on 300 of the 500 acres under the partial release terms of the deed, leaving a first
lien on the remaining 200 acres.64 The plan proposed payment of the creditor's claim by
assigning twenty-one third-party notes to the creditor in satisfaction of the claim.6" Each
note was secured by a separate lot.66 The creditor objected to the plan and argued that the
twenty-one notes from twenty-one obligors secured by twenty-one lots were not the indu-
bitable equivalent of its first lien on 200 acres. 67
The bankruptcy court in Sun Country confirmed the plan, and the district court and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed .68 The Fifth Circuit held that the notes were the indubitable equiva-
lent of the first lien on the 200 acres. 69 The present value of the notes was $153,770, over
$200 more than the debt.7" The lots securing the notes were valued at $287,500.71 The
applicability of the Sun Country decision to cases in which the debtor proposes the return
of tangible property in satisfaction of the secured claim or the entire debt is unclear. The
"property" transferred in Sun Country was not tangible property involving imprecise or dif-
ficult valuation issues.72
An asset payment plan was also confirmed in In re Bernard.73 The plan in Bernard pro-
posed to pay a portion of the secured claim by transferring part of the secured creditor's
collateral for a credit of $225 per acre.74 The secured creditor's appraiser had estimated
that the property was worth $200 per acre.75 The court found substantial agreement as to
value but accepted the $200 per acre credit. 76 As for the real property retained by the
debtor, in order to constitute the indubitable equivalent of the secured creditor's claim, the
debtors had to execute a new first lien in favor of the creditor and execute a new note for the
remaining balance on substantially the same terms as the original note. 7 7 It has been ar-
gued that the opinion is unclear about whether the new lien was intended to secure only the
remaining balance owed to the creditor or was also intended to secure any deficiency re-
sulting from the transfer to the creditor.78
In In re Walat Farms, Inc. ,79 the bankruptcy court denied confirmation of an asset pay-
ment plan.60 The plan in Walat proposed to deed 400 acres to one secured creditor and 360




67. Id. at 409.
68. Id. at 407.
69. id. at 409.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The discussion of Sun Country by the court in Walat, infra at note 90, indicates that the notes secured by lots proved to be
of questionable value.
73. 70 Bankr. 181 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986).
74. Id. at 185.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 186.
77. Id.
78. Asset Payment Plans Difficult to Confirm, I BANKR. COUNS. 1,4 (Jan. 4, 1988).
79. 70 Bankr. 330 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
80. Id. at 331.
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acres to another. 81 The secured creditor receiving the 400 acres under the plan held a first
mortgage on the entire 760 acres and voted to reject the plan.82 The court determined that
if the land being conveyed under the plan was worth the amount of the claim, the indubit-
able equivalent test would be met.83 The court, however, found this to be more a practical
than a theoretical problem. 84 The cause of the problem was the inherent difficulty in estab-
lishing a value for real estate.8" In Walat the range of values was between $750,000 and
$1,222,000.86
The court in Walat questioned its "ability" to fix the value of the real property. 7 The
court recognized that while certain real property that can be conveyed in an asset payment
plan would satisfy the indubitable equivalent requirement, farm real estate at that time
would not satisfy the requirement. 88 The dictionary defines "indubitable" to mean "too evi-
dent to be doubted."8 9 The court found doubts existed in the case.9"
The court determined that if the secured creditor in Walat received the real property in
satisfaction of the entire claim, selling it would take from one to two years. 91 In the mean-
time, interest would accrue.92 Additionally, a real estate commission and carrying costs
such as property taxes would reduce the amount of the sale. 93 Since the court found that
there was a deflationary market environment, it would be less likely that the surrender of
the new property would be the equivalent of the claim because it would take longer to sell
the property. 9 While the Walat court did not hold that asset payment plans are improper
per se, a factual context in which the court would be faced with a plan involving the forced
transfer of real property that would satisfy the court's criteria is difficult to imagine. As a
practical matter, if the real property were liquid enough to satisfy the court in Walat, the
debtor would agree to sell the property and pay the secured creditor in cash, or the secured
creditor would not object to the transfer.
81 AI. at 332.
82. Id. at 331.
83. Id. at 333.
84. Id.
85. Id. The court in Walat noted that real property has been recognized as a unique commodity. Id. at 334. Purchasers of land
may waive damages and seek specific performance. Id. The basis for such a remedy, according to the Walit court, was that the
value of real property "is difficult (some say 'impossible') to fix." Id. at 334 (citing 71 AM. JUR. 2D Specific Perfornance § 112
(1973)).
86. Id. at 333 n.2.
87. Id. at 334.
88. Id. at 337 n.8.
89. Id. at 334 (citing WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1985)).
90. Walat, 70 Bankr. at 337. The subsequent history of Sun Country supported the Walatcourt's fear. In Sun Country the Fifth
Circuit found sufficient evidence to support the bankruptcy court's findings that the package of notes was the indubitable equiva-
lent of the creditor's claim. 764 F.2d at 409. More than three years after confirmation, the Mlat court determined from parties'
counsel in Sun Country that the road had not been put in, nine of the twenty-one deeds had to be separately foreclosed, and the
value of the property was significantly less than the amount established by the bankruptcy court. 70 Bankr. at 336 n.7.
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V. In Re Sandy Ridge Development Corp.
A. Bankruptcy Court's Decision
The bankruptcy court in Sandy Ridge was confronted with an asset payment plan that
proposed the transfer of real property to creditors through the cram down provisions of
section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Code.95 Louisiana National Bank (LNB) was to receive
the real property on which it held the sole lien. 96 To the extent LNB was owed additional
monies, the debtor would transfer part of a second piece of property on which LNB had a
third lien up to $100,000, for a fair market value credit on the indebtedness to the extent of
$100,000.97 Livingston Bank, another creditor, would also receive a sufficient amount of
the second property "in full satisfaction of the indebtedness.""
The asset payment plan proposed to "transfer in satisfaction of claim."9 9 The court
found it unclear as to whether the debtor proposed the transfers in satisfaction of the entire
claim or, as the debtor argued, in satisfaction of the secured claim. 00 Apparently the court
determined transfers would be in full satisfaction of the entire claim.l°1
In Sandy Ridge the bankruptcy court reviewed the legislative history of section 1129 of
the Code.l"2 The evolution of the bill, according to the bankruptcy court, showed a lack of
complete agreement between the House and Senate over the use of property to pay secured
creditors.10 3 The original House Bill, H.R. 8200, provided that a plan could be crammed
down "if with respect to each class of secured claims ... each holder of a claim of such
class will receive or return under the plan . . . property of a value . . . equal to the al-
lowed amount of such claim . ",104
The report of the House Judiciary Committee explained the concept for payment of se-
cured claims with tangible property: Specifically, the court may confirm a plan over the ob-
jection of a class of secured claims if the members of that class are unimpaired or if they are to
receive under the plan property of a value equal to the allowed amount of their secured claims,
as determined under proposed 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The property is to be valued as of the
effective date of the plan, thus recognizing the time-value of money. As used throughout this
subsection, 'property' includes both tangible and intangible property, such as security of the
debtor or a successor to the debtor under a reorganization plan.
10 5
The bankruptcy court in Sandy Ridge noted that the language about payment of secured
creditors with property was not enacted. 10 6 Instead, section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Code
95.77 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987).
96. Id. at 70.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99.Id. at 70 n.8.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 76. The Fifth Circuit found that the bankruptcy court misconstrued the debtor's plan and the transfers were to be
made only to satisfy the secured claims. 881 F.2d at 1349.
102. Sandy Ridge, 77 Bankr. at 71-72.
103. Id. at 72.
104. Id. (quoting § I 129(b)(1)(B)(iii), H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., I st Sess., as reported by the House Committee of Judiciary,
Sept. 8, 1977).
105. Sandy Ridge, 77 Bankr. at 72 (quoting H.R. REt,. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6369).
106.77 Bankr. at 72.
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contains three provisions for payment of secured creditors: Two involve payments in cash,
and the third calls for realization of the "indubitable equivalent."'10 7 The court found that
the only explanation in the legislative history about indubitable equivalence is a reference to
abandonment of collateral. 0 8 According to the bankruptcy court, there is "no explicit
statement in the statute as enacted for cramdown of a plan on secured creditors calling for
payment in property. "109
The deletion of the H.R. 8200 language and the enactment of language calling for pay-
ment in cash or the indubitable equivalent was significant to the bankruptcy court in Sandy
Ridge. 110 If Congress had wanted to provide for payment of secured creditors in property,
the court concluded, Congress could have left H. R. 8200 in its original form.111 Accord-
ingly, the bankruptcy court held that "payment in property is permissible in cramdown
only if that transaction is the indubitable equivalence of cash paid on sale or in installments
secured by a lien." '112
In analyzing the burden of showing that a payment in property allowed the secured
creditor to realize the indubitable equivalent of its claim, the Sandy Ridge court found that
the burden exceeded proof by a preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. 113 If reasonable people could differ on the value of property, the value might be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, but the result would not be "indubitable."
'1 14
An appraisal that was "indubitable" was hard for the bankruptcy court to imagine. 115 The
provision requiring indubitable equivalence would be meaningless, according to the court,
if cram down could be achieved by a "battle of the appraisers" at the confirmation hear-
ing.
116
According to the bankruptcy court in Sandy Ridge, the Sun Country"7 case did not pro-
vide authority for the proposition that tangible property can be transferred in satisfaction
of secured debt merely by producing appraisal testimony that the property has value equal
to the amount of the claim.' 8 The property in Sun Country was not tangible property in-
volving highly imprecise and difficult valuation."
1 9
The bankruptcy court also addressed the problem of providing substantial margins for
valuation error by a transfer of more collateral to the creditor than necessary to satisfy the
secured claim. 120 While such a plan might be confirmed with the consent ofjunior classes,












117. 764 F2d406 (5th Cir. 1985).
118. Sandy Ridge, 77 Bankr. at 73.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 74.
121. Id. at 74 (citing Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 133, 142 (1979)).
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After denying confirmation of the asset payment plan in Sandy Ridge, the bankruptcy
court concluded that the plan was not filed in good faith.122 The court determined that the
debtor prepared its plan in disregard of its own interests and for the principal purpose of
eliminating the legal liability of non-debtor insider guarantors, not to reorganize.
1 23
B. Mixed Reaction to Bankruptcy Court's Decision
The bankruptcy judge in Sandy Ridge revisited asset payment plans in In re Arnold.124
The debtor in Arnold proposed to abandon collateral to the creditor in satisfaction of part of
the indebtedness and to pay the remainder either in installments or in a lump sum. 1 25 The
court again found that an "involuntary satisfaction of secured indebtedness and the elimi-
nation of rights against guarantors or other collateral to the extent of a 'deemed payment'
based on a court valuation of property depending on appraisal testimony is not the indubi-
table equivalent of a creditor's claim."126
The bankruptcy court in In re B. W Alpha, Inc. '27 denied confirmation of a plan that
sought to convey a hotel and the related personal property to the secured creditor in full
satisfaction of the debt.1 28 While the plan was not approved, the B. W Alpha court found
the bankruptcy court's decision in Sandy Ridge too restrictive.1 29 In order for property to
be the indubitable equivalent of a creditor's claim so that the Chapter 11 plan could be
crammed down over the objection of an impaired secured creditor, the court held that the
property must produce a cash flow or be capable of being sold within a reasonable time so
that the secured creditor can realize cash. 130 The proposed transfer of the debtor's sole as-
set to the secured creditor in full satisfaction of the secured creditor's claim could not be
confirmed since it did not provide the creditor with the indubitable equivalent of its
claim. 31 The debtor had been unable to sell the hotel for several years. 32 Shifting the bur-
den of sale to the secured creditor could not be considered the indubitable equivalent.
1 33
The district court affirmed the denial of confirmation in B. W. Alpha and held that the
Chapter 11 plan did not give the secured creditor the indubitable equivalent of a cash pay-
ment since there was evidence that the secured creditor would need five years to realize the
value of the hotel. 
1 34
In the case of In re Elm Creek Joint Venture,1 31 the bankruptcy court confirmed an asset
payment plan which provided for a transfer of certain property upon which a secured credi-
tor had a pre-petition lien with a credit against the debt based upon a valuation made by the
122. Sandy Ridge, 77 Bankr. at 80.
123. Id. According to the bankruptcy court in Sandy Ridge, the guaranty is arguably extinguished if the plan provides for full
satisfaction of the debt upon the transfer of the property since the debt is judicially determined to be paid. Id. at 77.
124. 80 Bankr. 806 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987).
125. Id. at 808.
126. Id.
127. 89 Bankr. 592 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
128. Id. at 594.





134. 100 Bankr. 831, 833 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
135.93 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
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court at the confirmation hearing. 136 The Elm Creek court criticized the opinion of the
bankruptcy court in Sandy Ridge, finding that it "makes the phrase [indubitable equiva-
lence]. . . almost a talisman, almost an occult formula demanding payment of the secured
lender in the exact amount due and owing or in an exact amount measured by an exact valu-
ation of collateral."1 37 The concept of indubitable equivalence in the Code, according to the
court in Elm Creek, allows the bankruptcy judge to make a determination of value neces-
sary to confirm an asset payment plan.
138
The bankruptcy court in In re Thornebrook Development Corp. 139 relied upon the bank-
ruptcy court's decision in Sandy Ridge in denying the confirmation of an asset payment
plan. 40 The plan proposed to deed real property to the secured creditor in full satisfaction
of its claim.' 4 ' As a result, the creditor could not seek any deficiency against guarantors.142
Such a plan did not provide the creditor with the indubitable equivalent within the meaning
of the cram down provisions according to the Thornebrook court, even though the collat-
eral had a stipulated value in excess of the creditor's claim." In denying confirmation, the
bankruptcy court referred to the legislative history of section 1129 of the Code which states
that "[a]bandonment of the collateral to the creditor would clearly satisfy indubitable
equivalent, as would a lien on similar collateral." '" The court suggested that abandonment
of property to a secured creditor satisfies the indubitable equivalent requirement where the
creditor retains all of its state law remedies, including the right to seek payment of any defi-
ciency. 115
C. Ultimate Reversal by Fifth Circuit
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's rejection of the Chapter 11 plan in
Sandy Ridge. 146 In an unpublished opinion, the Fifth Circuit initially affirmed the decision
as well. "47 Although this opinion was withdrawn, a review of the opinion is instructive.
In the unpublished opinion, the original panel did not find Sun Country to be supporting
authority for the debtor's plan.'" The third-party notes in Sun Country were deemed the
equivalent of cash because payment was assured."4 9 If the real property was worth the
value as attested to by experts for one of the secured creditors, that secured creditor would
not be paid.15 0 If forced to accept payment in full from the transfer of the real property, the
secured creditor would have forfeited its rights to proceed against the three guarantors for
136. Id. at 107.
137. Id. at I11.
138. Id. at 112.
139. 96 Bankr. 350 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989).
140. Id. at 351-52.
141. Id. at 351.
142. Id. at 352.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 352 n.3. (quoting 124 CONG. RFc. H 11104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) and 124 CONG. REc. S17421 (daily ed. Oct.
6, 1978)).
145.96 Bankr. at 352.
146. Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank, No. 87-578-B (M.D. La. Jan. 13, 1988) (judgment affirming the opin-
ion of the bankruptcy court).
147. Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank, No. 88-3072 (5th Cir. July 5, 1988) (opinion affirming district court
and responding to the district court for the consideration of the imposition of sanctions).
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its losses. 15 The court held that such a change in position for the secured creditor was "not
even a rough approximation of the indubitable equivalence which Section
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Code mandates."1 52 The original panel determined that the plan
was not filed in good faith because its apparent purpose was not "the salvaging of a busi-
ness" but was instead an attempt to discharge non-debtor guarantors.1 5 3 Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit initially remanded the imposition of sanctions to the district court.' 5 4 The
original opinion of the Fifth Circuit was later withdrawn, 15  and the case was reheard by a
different panel. 15 6 After rehearing, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. '
5 7
An essential point in understanding the final opinion of the Fifth Circuit is the court's
interpretation of the actual terms of the debtor's plan. 58 The Fifth Circuit found that the
bankruptcy court misinterpreted the debtor's plan to propose transfer of real estate to LNB
in full satisfaction of the entire claim.1 59 Instead, the Fifth Circuit found that the plan pro-
vided for transfer of the real property "for a credit on the indebtedness to the extent of the
value" of the property.' 6
The Fifth Circuit then analyzed LNB's claim and determined that LNB was an underse-
cured creditor. 16' An undersecured creditor is one whose collateral has a value insufficient
to cover the entire debt.' 62 Section 506(a) of the Code bifurcates an undersecured credi-
tor's total claim into secured and unsecured claims. 163 The difference between the collat-
eral's value and the debt becomes an unsecured claim.1 64 In Sandy Ridge, LNB's secured
claim was equal to the value of the real property securing the first mortgage.
165
The plan provisions in Sandy Ridge were then analyzed in light of the characterization
of LNB as an undersecured creditor. The Fifth Circuit agreed that the indubitable equiva-
lent language was the "heart" of the issue. 166 The key determination was the precise mean-
ing of the phrase "such claims" in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Code.' 67 The court
concluded that "such claims" could only mean secured claims.' 68 Section 1129(b)(2) is di-





155. 18 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 13 (5th Cir. 1988).
156. 881 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1989).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1348-49.




163. Id. Section 506(a) of the Code states in relevant part: "[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property. . . is
a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property .... " 11 U.S.c. §
506(a) (Supp. 11978).
164. 881 F.2d at 1349.
165. Id.
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and section 1129(b)(2)(B),' 69 which deals with unsecured claims. Since the indubitable
equivalent language is part of section 1129(b)(2)(A), the court determined that it must
deal with secured claims.' 0 According to the Fifth Circuit, section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)
could have been drafted to provide for "the realization of the holders of secured claims of
the indubitable equivalent of their secured claims."' 7' Since the value of the creditor's se-
cured claim was equal to the value of the collateral, the Fifth Circuit held that a plan satis-
fies the requirements of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) when it provides that the secured
creditors would realize the indubitable equivalent of the real property.' 72 The Sandy Ridge
plan provided that the secured creditor would receive the actual real property itself, and
"since common sense tells us that property is the indubitable equivalent of itself, this por-
tion of the current plan satisfies the 'indubitable equivalent' requirement."
73
The Fifth Circuit dismissed the bankruptcy court's concern that an involuntary cram
down would release third-party guarantors from liability.' 74 First, the Fifth Circuit found
that the plan made no express provision for such a release.175 Second, an analysis of both
the Code and Louisiana law indicated to the Fifth Circuit that the concern was unfounded
and that the bankruptcy petition of Sandy Ridge could not operate to release the non-debtor
guarantors of the debt.'
The Fifth Circuit also dismissed the objection of the secured creditor on the valuation
issue. 177 The secured creditor argued that the bankruptcy court could not "set the value of
the property but must instead in all instances require the debtor to abandon the property
and let the foreclosure sale determine market price.' 78 No such requirement was in the
169. Section I 129(b)(2)(B) provides:
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes the
following requirements:
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain on account of such claim
property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain
under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property.
II U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1 1978).




174. Id. at 1350-52. The court also dismissed the concern of the bankruptcy court over the propriety of the liquidating plan in
Sandy Ridge. Id. at 1352. The distribution of property to creditors under a liquidating plan, according to the court, is not per se
improper under the Code. Id.
175. d. at 1350-51. Bia see Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1987) (rcs judicata effect of order approv-
ing plan which expressly provides for release of third-party guarantor who was also a creditor).
176. Sandy Ridge, 881 F.2d at 1351-52. Even though the non-debtor guarantors could not be released from the debt as struc-
tured by the debtors in the plan, the Fifth Circuit still shared the bankruptcy court's concern over the debtor's apparent lack of
good faith. Id. at 1353. Apparently certain classes of creditors were technically impaired in order to have them vote in favor of
the plan and then satisfy the requirement of§ I 129(a)(10) for cram down. Id. On remand the bankruptcy court was instructed to
consider the requirement of good faith. Id.
177. Id. at 1353-54,
178. Id. at 1354.
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Code according to the court. 179 The general market conditions are taken into consideration
by the bankruptcy court when valuing collateral.1 80 While the court recognized that "prop-
erty valuation is not an exact science," it is an integral part of the bankruptcy process.181
The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing and the suggestion for rehearing en
banc.182 The court reiterated its earlier holding:
[D]istribution of estate property, at values properly fixed by the bankruptcy court, to non-
consenting creditors under a liquidating reorganization is notper se categorically prohibited as
a matter of law under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code[,] . . .the plan in question meets
the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 129(b)(2)(A)(iii) with respect to appellee LNB's secured
claim .... 183
On remand, the bankruptcy court was required to determine whether the plan was fair
and equitable and did not discriminate unfairly for the purposes of cram down and whether
it satisfied other requirements.'"
VI. CREDITOR REMEDIES: AVOIDING RISKS OF ASSET PAYMENT PLANS
There may be avenues for the secured creditor to avoid receiving payment in a Chapter
11 plan through the transfer of property. The case of In re Elijah offers a possible remedy
for the oversecureC creditor faced with an asset payment plan. 185 In Elijah the court held
that an oversecured creditor can preserve a guaranteed secured deficiency that may result
after disposition of the collateral by making a section 111 (b) election, regardless of the
value of the collateral on the date of confirmation.186 The resulting secured claim would
have to be paid in accordance with the cram down standards of section 1129(b) of the
Code.187 Consequently, the holding in Elijah may neutralize a debtor's effort to confirm a
plan providing for a partial return of collateral .188 At least one commentator has stated that
the utilization of the section 1111 (b) election by an oversecured creditor to avoid payment
of its claim by a partial transfer of collateral securing its debt is highly questionable.' 89 Un-
til Elijah is overruled or controlling authority takes a contrary position, the section
179. Id. Section 506(a) provides "[V]alue shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed
disposition or use of the property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such deposition or use or on a plan affecting such credi-
tor's interest." II U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. 11978).
Bankruptcy Rule 3012 states:
The court may determine the value of a claim secured by a lien on property in which the estate has as interest on
motion of any party in interest and after a hearing on notice to the holder of the secured claim and any other entity
as the court may direct.
II U.S.C. app. § 3012 (Supp. 1 1978).
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the valuation of the property transferred in an asset payment plan should be made by the bank-
ruptcy court. See In re Texas Extrusion Corp., 844 F.2d 1142, 1165 (5th Cir. 1988) ("valuation of the assets ofa debtor in bank-
ruptcy. . . is an integral part of the confirmation process under Chapter 11"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 311 (1988).
180. Sandy Ridge, 881 F.2d at 1354 (citing 3 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY 502-25 (1975)).
181. 881 F.2dat 1354.
182. 889 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1989).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 664.
185. 41 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
186. Id. at 351. See also Waas, supra note 8, at 104.
187. Waas, supra note 8, at 104.
188. id.
189. Id. at 106.
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1111 (b) election provides an option for the oversecured creditor seeking to avoid payment
through a forced transfer of property.
The undersecured creditor in In re Griffiths'90 was also able to block an asset payment
plan by making an election under section 1111 (b) of the Code.' 9 The Chapter 11 debtor
proposed to return a portion of its collateral to the undersecured creditor and to pay the
value of the remaining collateral in cash.1"2 The court required the debtor to pay the re-
maining amount owed and not simply the value of the remaining collateral.193 Once the
election had been made, the total amount owed was the allowed amount of the claim.194
Consistent with the legislative objective of section 1111 (b), the creditor preserved its right
to realize the potential appreciation in its collateral. 95
The Fifth Circuit in a footnote offers another possible strategy for the undersecured
creditor. 196 The undersecured creditor's primary concern in Sandy Ridge was receiving the
"cushion" it would have if it was able to foreclose on the real property and bid on the prop-
erty at two-thirds of its appraised value as allowed under Louisiana law.197 Given this con-
cern, the Fifth Circuit suggested this creditor should have moved for relief from the
automatic stay.198 Section 362(d) of the Code provides that a bankruptcy court "shall"
grant leave from the automatic stay if (a) the debtor does not have equity in the property
and (b) such property is not necessary for an effective reorganization.19 9 In Sandy Ridge it
was conceded by the debtor that no equity was in the real property0 ° and that the plan was
one of liquidation." 1 Accordingly, if the debtor is proposing the forced transfer of property
in satisfaction of a creditor's claim, an undersecured creditor should consider moving for
relief from the automatic stay when the bankruptcy court's determination of value is or will
likely be excessive.
VII. CONCLUSION
The rationale of the Fifth Circuit in the final opinion of Sandy Ridge is not without
merit. The bankruptcy courts are called upon to determine the value of collateral in a num-
ber of different contexts. The problem arises when the valuation will determine the extent
of payment on a secured claim. If asset payment plans are allowed, the oversecured credi-
190. 27 Bankr. 873 (Bankr. Kan. 1983).
191. Id. at 876-77.
192. Id. at 875.
193. Id. at 876.
194. Id.
195. See Waas, supra note 8, at 105-06. See also Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 506(a) and
1111 (b): Second Looks at Judicial Valuation of Collateral, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 253 (1989).
196. Sandy Ridge, 881 F.2d at 1354 n. 19.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Section 362(d) provides:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided
under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this section, if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
11 U.S.C. §362 (Supp. 11978).
200. Sandy Ridge, 881 F.2d at 1354 n. 19.
201. Id. (citing, e.g., In re 6200 Ridge, Inc., 69 Bankr. 837, 844 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)).
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tor may only receive part of its collateral in full satisfaction of the indebtedness. The
undersecured creditor may receive its collateral in full satisfaction of its secured claim.
The ultimate sale of the collateral may result in a deficiency. As part of the asset payment
plan, the creditor may be denied the opportunity to seek payment of the deficiency. Thus,
the asset payment plan shifts the risk of valuation to the secured creditor.
An equitable result could be reached if the court estimated the secured claim in a man-
ner similar to the procedure provided in section 502(c) of the Code. 20 2 This procedure
would allow the court to determine whether the claim is fully secured or undersecured for
such purposes as voting, classification, and feasibility. Once the claim is estimated, the
collateral could then be sold. After the sale, the creditor would have an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of its claim for any resulting deficiency.203 At that point, the parties could
raise challenges to the commercial reasonableness of the sale.
This proposal avoids the problem of transferring excess collateral to the secured creditor
to provide for a margin of error in valuation. If the collateral sells for more than the debt
owed to the secured creditor, the excess net proceeds can be paid into the estate.
While this proposal does not have the finality of the asset payment plan, it provides for a
more equitable resolution of the competing interests of the debtor and creditor. Since the
bankruptcy court often retains jurisdiction over a number of post-confirmation matters,
the reconsideration of the secured creditor's claim should not be burdensome to the court
or to the parties.
The Code clearly authorizes abandonment of the collateral to the secured creditor and
the filing of any resulting deficiency claim. Also, the Code authorizes the sale of the col-
202. Section 502(c) provides:
(c) There shall be estimated for purpose of allowance under this ection-
(1) any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of which, as the case may be, would unduly
delay the administration of the case; or
(2) any right to payment arising from a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance.
II U.S.C. § 502(c) (Supp. 11978).
"Congress intended that all claims, including unliquidated and contingent claims, be 'dealt with' in the bankruptcy proceeding." In
re Brints Cotton Mktg., Inc., 737 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5808). Further, it was intended that "all claims against the debtor be converted
into dollar amounts." 737 F.2d at 1340 (citing S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5758, 5851). Therefore, "the Code provides that a claim which is contingent or unliquidated shall be estimated, if
the fixing or liquidation of [the claim] ...would unduly delay the closing of the estate." 737 F.2d at 1340-41 (citing section
502(c)(1) of the Code). See generally Weintraub & Resnick, Treatment of Contingent and Unliquidated Claims Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 373 (1983); Comment, Procedures for Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in Bankruptcy,
35 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1982); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 502.03 (15th ed. 1989). In estimating a claim the bankruptcy courts
should use whatever method is best suited under the circumstances. Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co., 691 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir.
1982); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 502.03 (15th ed. 1989). The bankruptcy court is bound by the legal rules which govern the
ultimate value of the claim. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRiUTCY 502.03 at 502-75 (15th ed. 1989).
203. Section 502(0) ofthe Code provides:
(j) A claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause. A reconsidered claim may be allowed
or disallowed according to the equities of the case. Reconsideration of a claim under this subsection does not affect the
validity of any payment or transfer from the estate made to a holder of an allowed claim on account of such allowed claim
that is not reconsidered, but if areconsidered claim is allowed and is of the same class as such holder's claim, such holder
may not receive any additional payment or transfer from the estate on account of such holder's claim until the holder of
such reconsidered and allowed claim receives payment on account of such claim proportionate in value to that already
received by such other holder. This subsection does not alter or modify the trustee's right to recover from a creditor any
excess payment or transfer made to such creditor.
II U.S.C. §502 (Supp. 1 1978).
The protections provided in section 502(0) are supplemented by Bankruptcy Rule 3008: "A party in interest may move for recon-
sideration of an order allowing or disallowing a claim against the estate. The court after a hearing on notice shall enter an appro-
priate order." I I U.S.C. app. § 3008 (Supp. 1 1978).
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lateral by the debtor with the lien of the secured creditor attaching to the proceeds. Pay-
ment in property, with the amount of the payment based upon a court-fixed value of the
property, is not expressly authorized in the Code or in the legislative history. The practical
problems associated with asset payment plans require strict judicial scrutiny of such plans
and possibly legislative reform.

